This paper examines the impact of free trade areas (FTAs) on the world trading system. It uses a partial equilibrium framework among three countries where Cobb-Douglas utility function is applied. It is found that FTAs are primarily detrimental to multilateral trading system and are stumbling blocs to global free trade (GFT), whether in a symmetric or an asymmetric case. This conclusion is based, firstly, upon the findings that the utility of member countries in a FTA are higher than status quo, so they are interested in forming a FTA, and secondly, after forming a FTA, they don't have incentive to let the third country join in since their utility would be lowered.
Introduction

Background
The wave of Regional trade arrangements (RTAs), such as free trade areas (FTA) and customs unions, has been attached considerably substantial attention by economists. The surge in RTAs has continued unabated since the early 1990s. By November 2019, some 481 notifications of RTAs have been received by WTO. The overall number of RTAs in force has been increasingly steadily to 302, a trend likely to be strengthened by the many RTAs currently under negotiations. Of the 481 notifications of RTAs, free trade agreements (FTAs), partial scope agreements and economic integration agreements account for over 90%, while customs unions account for less than 10% (World Trade Organization, 2019) . So this paper will focus on FTAs, which are much more common and have attracted more attention than customs unions.
A free-trade area is a trading bloc whose member countries have signed a free-trade agreement, which eliminates tariffs, import quotas, and preferences on most goods and services traded between them. The aim of free trade areas is usually to remove barriers between member countries so as to increase trade. As global free trade (GFT) is a welfare-improving and optimal state for all the countries as a whole, much research has been made on whether FTA is a building bloc or a stumbling bloc to GFT. Nevertheless, over the past three decades, no consensus has been reached. For many economists, it seems that FTA is more likely to be a stumbling bloc to GFT than a building bloc. As Bhagwati (1991) puts forwards, FTA is analyzed under static and dynamic time-paths, and even when FTAs can improve the welfare of member countries in static they may be a stumbling bloc for further liberalization. Levy (1997) shows that bilateral agreements in a median voter model may finally lead to the damage of multilateral trade agreements. And McLaren (2002) finds that when considering the negotiating costs and sector-specific sunk investments, multilateral trading system may work at first, but a reduction in member countries' gain from export can make it infeasible in the end. Yi (2000) finds that although the formation of a free-trade area is a Pareto improvement, FTA won't lead to global free trade in the end because of free-riding problems. What's more, Krishna (1998) and Panagariya (1996) also view FTA as a stumbling bloc to attain global free trade. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) use a three-country world model and identify three opposing effects of preferential agreements on multilateral trade system. The relative strengths of these three effects determine the impact of preferential agreements on multilateralism. When the countries are sufficiently impatient, the formation of free trade areas will lead to an overall deterioration in multilateral tariff cooperation. So free trade area is a stumbling bloc in transition but a building bloc in the long run. Tariffs will increase when two countries' trade flows are small before forming a FTA, but will be lowered after countries forming a FTA in order to reduce the tariff cost due to larger trade flows. Based upon an extensive data set covers most of the world trade over the past 60 years and 240 RTAs, Bernhard and Macro (2011) point out that RTAs are building blocs to multilateral trade liberalization. Baldwin (2006) describes what the final steps to global free trade might look like, and points out that offshoring can create a force that encourages regionalism to multilateralism.
However, Levy (1997) shows if FTA cannot lead to further multilateral liberalization, then FTA can be viewed as a stumbling bloc to global free trade. Levy uses a framework where the median voter plays a pivotal role in making trading decisions. It shows that bilateral agreements between countries with similar endowments offer disproportionately large gains to key agents in a country, which raise their reservation utility over the multilateralism level. As key agents in a country don't have incentive to reach a utility under their reservation level, FTA is detrimental for further multilateral liberalization. In addition, he mentions that bilateralism can never provide political support for multilateralism, which also strengths the points of the paper.
Some papers also point out that the results cannot be clear-cut. Cheong and Wong (2010) use a three-country world model and each country has a numeraire good produced by competitve firms and a homogeneous good produced by oligopolist firms. The authors value the utility of each country from the perspective of producers, and represent utility by producers' profit. If global free trade is finally reached by WTO path but cannot be reached by FTA path, then FTA is said to be a stumbling bloc. However, if global free trade is finally reached by FTA path but cannot be reached by WTO path, then FTA is said to be a building bloc. The paper compares the utility level under WTO path and FTA path, and it is found that either path can be feasible under certain situations. So the results cannot be clear-cut. Saggi and Yildiz (2011) apply a partial equilibrium framework in a three-country world. Preferences over the two goods are quasilinear, while firms compete in quantities and make independent decisions regarding how much to sell in each market. The paper shows that results are ambiguous: when the degree of cost asymmetry among three countries is small, free trade areas play as stumbling role towards global free trade; and when the degree of cost asymmetry is high, multilateral trade system is an equilibrium only if countries choose to form FTAs. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the economic environment is described and the model is set up. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium and figures out each country's utility under four cases. Section 4 specifies the model by investigating the symmetric endowment case and section 5 discusses the asymmetric endowment case. In section 6, conclusion remarks are made. 
The Model
Consider a modified version of the partial equilibrium framework developed by Saggi and Yildiz (2011) . There are three countries: A, B and C and three goods: a, b and c. Good a and b are two non-numeraire goods and c is a numeraire good. Each country is endowed with only two goods: country A has units of goods b and units of goods c; country B has units of good a and units of good c; and country C is endowed with units of good a and units of goods b. In terms of trade, each country imports the good with which it is not endowed and exports at least one of its endowment goods.
These 3 countries have identical utility function given by
is the utility level of country i and is its consumption of good j, b a j ,  and c. Denote the income level of country i by i I . With Cobb-Douglas utility function, it is optimal for the consumers to spend their income according to:
The income level is equal to:
(3)
The equilibrium conditions for the three goods are
Since we assume that goods c is a numeraire good, = 1. Substitute (2) into (4), these three equations in (4) contain only two independent equations, which can be solved for the two relative prices and when the tariff rates are given.
We consider four situations:
• "f" -global free trade, with all countries removing their tariff restrictions.
• "0" -status quo situation without trade liberalization. Country i imposes a positive ad valorem tariff rate 0  i t on imported goods.
• "1" -bilateral trade liberalization. In this case, country A and B form a free trade area and remove the tariffs imposed on the goods imported from each other. However, they maintain their initial tariff rates on country C and country C also keeps its initial tariff rate. We do not allow country A and B to adjust their external tariff after the formation of FTA between them. This is consistent with what we observe in reality: countries keep their external tariff rates unchanged on the third party after they establish a FTA.
• "1" -bilateral trade liberalization. In this case, country A and C form a free trade area and leave country B isolated.
The objective of this model is to consider various cases regarding trade liberalization available to WTO members today. With the rapid growth of RTA, case "1" has been made possible under GATT Article XXIV. We compare the welfare levels of the countries in case "1" with those in case "f". In particular, we are interested in the conditions under which FTA is a "stumbling bloc" or a "building bloc" towards the world trading system. E  
. As explained earlier, condition (4c) is redundant. In matrix form, the above linear equations can be rewritten as:
Then, the two equilibrium relative prices can be solved by using Cramer's rule:
. Once the equilibrium prices are obtained, the income level of each country can be computed by using (5). The consumption on each good are derived from (2), the simple form of the demand for each goods are:
Then the utility of each country under free trade can be evaluated using (1). At equilibrium:
Status Quo (Situation "0")
Consider the status quo equilibrium. All countries impose positive, non-prohibitive tariffs on the imported goods from other countries. Denote the tariff rate imposed by country i by
. Denote the domestic price of good j in country i by and the international price of good j by 0 . With good c as the numeraire good, its international price is 1, i.e. 0 = 1. As explained earlier, if these countries have symmetric endowments, then under free trade each country will import the good with which the country is not endowed and will export the other two goods. We assume that the endowments of the countries are close to symmetric so that with the tariffs these countries have patterns of trade the same as that in the symmetric case under free trade. In other ijef.ccsenet.org International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 12, No. 1; 2020 26 words, country A (B, C) imports good a (b, c) before any FTA is formed. Thus domestic prices in different countries are related to the international prices:
We now examine how the equilibrium prices are determined. Firstly consider country A. Its national income is given by Substitute this national income function into (2a) to give
Making use of conditions (2) and (9), the consumption demand for all goods in country A are as follows:
(10c) Using the similar approach, the national income functions and the consumption function of the other two countries are Using market clear condition (4), substitute all consumption function into it, the price of good a and b can be derived through the following linear equation system:
and C. Equation (16) are solved for the equilibrium international prices:
Country A-B FTA (Situation "1")
In this situation, country A and B form a free trade area. Then they remove the tariff restriction on the goods imported from each other. We assume that the tariffs on the goods between country A and C, country B and country C remain unchanged. We also assume that the trade patterns of the countries are the same as those in the symmetric case, with country A (B, C) importing good a (b, c).
The FTA means that each member country receives a preferential trade treatment from the other member country. For example, when entering country A, the good from country B is not subject to any tariff while the one from country C is. As a result, to import good a, country A will prefer to import it from country B rather than country C, given that both countries offer the good at the same price. The increase in demand will bid up the price of good a in country B but the drop in demand will cause a decrease in its price in country C. In equilibrium, if country A imports good a from country B and C, the price of good a in country B must be higher than the price in country C and the difference must be equal to the per unit tariff rate imposed by country A. Denote the price of good a in country C by The tariff revenue of country A is generated from its import from country C. So we have to determine the import volume from country C. To determine the volume, note that consumption for good a in country C is, from (14a) (24) where Equation (24) are solved for the equilibrium international prices:
Country A-C FTA (Situation "1")
In the last situation, A-B FTA has been discussed. However, there is another way to form a FTA, that is A-C FTA. In this situation, country A and C form a free trade area. Then they remove the tariff restriction on the goods imported from each other. We assume that the tariffs on the goods between country A and B, country C and country B remain unchanged. We also assume that the trade patterns of the countries are the same as those in the symmetric case, with country A (B, C) importing good a (b, c).
The FTA means that each member country receives a preferential trade treatment from the other member country. For example, when entering country A, the good from country C is not subject to any tariff while the one from country B is. As a result, to import good a, country A will prefer to import it from country C rather than country B, given that both countries offer the good at the same price. The increase in demand will bid up the price of good a in country C but the drop in demand will cause a decrease in its price in country B. In equilibrium, if country A imports good a from country B and C, the price of good a in country C must be higher than the price in country B and the difference must be equal to the per unit tariff rate imposed by country A. Denote the price of good a in country B by The tariff revenue of country A is generated from its import from country B. So we have to determine the import volume from country B. To determine the volume, note that consumption for good a in country B is, from (13a) (25) Thus country B's export of good a to country A is equal to (26) Using the import level in (26), the income level of country A is equal to (27) Condition (27) gives the consumption demands:
Similarly, consumption for good c in country B is, from (13c) Country C's import of good c from country B is: 
GFT case:
In such a situation,
. Each country will export one third of each endowed good to the country which does not have this good, and import one third units of absent good from each of the other two countries. The utility level for each country are also the same, With these equilibrium prices, the consumption of each country can be evaluated using (11) and (14).
Compared to free trade, each country consumes less on the good which it is not endowed with, since the tariff rates are imposed. Each country imports The utility level of each country are as follows For country A, the utility under A-B FTA and A-C FTA are the same. So the FTA is a stumbling bloc not only in A-B FTA case, but also in A-C FTA case.
Asymmetric Endowment Case
In asymmetric case, FTA may serve as a "stumbling bloc", too. Let's consider an asymmetric case: Assume 
GFT case:
In such a case, two equilibrium relative prices are Once the equilibrium prices are obtained, the income level of each country can be computed by using (5). The consumption on each good are derived from (2). Then the utility of each country under free trade can be evaluated by using (1). At equilibrium:
When 1   , the endowment of country C is less than the other two countries, its equilibrium utility is also less than the utility level of the other two countries. Status Quo case: We start from a simple case, assume With these equilibrium prices, the consumption of each country can be evaluated using (11) Take the difference, yielding that
In conclusion, we have SQ GFT FTA
So far, through a series of comparison, we can conclude that: in an asymmetric case, if t is too low, then country A and B has no incentives to pursue global free trade. In this sense, multilateralism is not working. But if we allow for the establishment of bilateral free trade, bilateral free trade may serve as a building bloc towards global free trade. From the above analysis, it is easily seen country A and B would like to form a FTA first. The formation of this FTA put country C in a worse position since < . Now if A and B want to include country C into the free trade area, country C will agree. However, country A and B don't have incentives to do so, since their utility are lower under GFT:
> . So in this case, bilateral free trade serve as a stumbling bloc in the end.
A-C FTA case: In this case, country A and C establish a FTA and leaves country B isolated. In an asymmetric case, from the formula (25), (28), (31), we can obtain the consumption of good a and c in each country:
According to the formula (4), the equilibrium prices are derived as
The consumption of each country can be obtained by putting the equilibrium prices into formula (25), (28), (31), then the utility level of each country can be calculated:
In which
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Since A-B FTA and A-C FTA are two ways to form a FTA, and maybe two ways to get GFT eventually, we have to know which way country A would like more, A-B FTA or A-C FTA. So the utility of country A under A-B FTA and A-C FTA should be compared. From the following relation, it is clear that country A will choose C to form a FTA instead of country B.
Based upon the above relations of utility, we can conclude that: country A and B have incentives to form a FTA as > , while country A and C also have incentive to form a FTA as > . However, the utility of country A is higher when it chooses C to form a FTA than chooses B. So country A will definitely choose C to form a FTA.
When the tariff rate is not too high, say * 0 t t   , country A and C form a FTA. Country B has incentive to join the FTA because its utility under GFT is higher than under FTA:
> . But country A and C don't want B to join in since their utility level will be lower under GFT:
> . In this situation, we say FTA is a stumbling bloc to GFT.
When the tariff is a bit higher, that is * t t  , country A and C form a FTA. Again, country B has incentive to join the FTA and Country A doesn't want B to join. However, country C hopes B can join because its utility will be higher under GFT this time:
> . But since A is a much bigger country than C, its discursive power has a larger weight in any decision in FTA. So again, country B has no access to the FTA in this situation and FTA is a stumbling bloc to GFT.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I analyze the impact of a free trade area on the incentives for further liberalization. And it shows that free trade area always plays as a stumbling bloc no matter when the three-country model is under symmetric case or asymmetric case.
The results of the asymmetric case in this paper can be summarized as follows. Before forming a FTA, the isolated country's utility would be lower than status quo, that is to say all the three countries have incentives to form a FTA because the isolated one would be put in the worst place. Then we assume, country A is a powerful country. And it will choose country C to be its free trade partner, because it is more profitable for country A to form a FTA with country C instead of country B. After forming the A-C FTA, country B would like to join in since its utility would be higher under GFT than A-C FTA. However, when the tariff is not too high, as the utility of country A and C would be lower under GFT, they don't want B to join in. When the tariff is high enough, such as tariffs of automobile industry and luxury products, the utility of country A would be lower under GFT and that of country C would be higher, i.e. country A will object GFT while country C will propose. Since country A is a large country with higher discursive power in making decisions, whether tariff is high or low, A-C FTA won't let country B to join them. So FTA plays a detrimental role to multilateral trading system and global free trade.
This result can illustrate some interesting phenomena such as the previously US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). TPP, also known as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, is a multilateral trading system which aims at promoting further liberalization in the Asian-Pacific region. The United States had a leading role before it's withdrawal from TPP because of its strong economical and political power. So the United States could be seen as the large country A, while the other countries can be seen as the small country C. However, as the world second largest economic entity, China hasn't participated in TPP negotiations. And TPP has been widely considered to aim at and contain China (here can be seen as the large country B). President Obama claimed that there would be friendly and constructive competition between the Unites States and China only if China would like to appreciate CNY to balance trade deficit, respect intellectual property rights and allow American companies to compete equally in China. It is clear that China was not welcomed now by TPP, which can be elaborated by our paper.
As for the asymmetric case, large countries have incentives to form a FTA with a small country. Many large countries in the real world positively seek opportunities to collaborate with small countries. In 2002, China and This paper also has much space to improve and needs further study. First, I use partial equilibrium framework and Cobb-Douglas utility function is applied to simplify countries' utility into the function of their consumption level. But this way of representing a country's utility is a bit restricted since producers' profit and governments' tariff revenue are eliminated. Second, tariffs and the decisions to join FTA might be endogenous. As a member country may increase its tariff set against non-member countries and lower its tariff against other member countries after entering a FTA, tariff and decisions should be considered as endogenous. Third, we assume that the endowments of the countries are close to symmetric so that with the tariffs these countries have patterns of trade the same as that in the symmetric case under free trade. In other words, country A (B, C) imports good a (b, c) before any FTA is formed. However, when the degree of endowment asymmetry is large, large countries may not import from small country, so the whole model may not hold. Fourth, this paper assumes all the countries have certain endowments instead of producing goods for trade, thus, it ignores the cost of producing goods for trade. After calculation, we find that when t > 1 , − SQ > 0, where 10% < 1 < 20%. If the degree of endowment asymmetry is small, for example,
, it is found that when t > 3 , − SQ > 0, where 7% < 3 < 8%. As we have assumed that the endowments of the countries are close to symmetric so that with the tariffs these countries have patterns of trade the same as that in the symmetric case under free trade,  cannot be too small, otherwise the whole model might not holds. And according to the external tariffs statistics, tariffs are usually over 10%, so − SQ > 0 will hold. In the area above the curve, − SQ > 0, country C prefers global free trade. In the area below the curve, − SQ < 0, country C prefers status quo equilibrium utility. We only consider the case with 0  t , when 1   , i.e., country C has a smaller endowment, country C prefers global free trade whatever tariff level in the status quo is. Figure 8 , we find that − > 0. If the degree of endowment asymmetry is small, for example, 9 . 0   or 8
GFT C and
